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Ever since the traditional criteria for medical decision-making capacity (understanding,
appreciation, reasoning, evidencing a choice) were formulated, they have been criticized
for not taking sufficient account of emotions or values that seem, according to the
critics and in line with clinical experiences, essential to decision-making capacity. The
aim of this paper is to provide a nuanced and structured overview of the arguments
provided in the literature emphasizing the importance of these factors and arguing for
their inclusion in competence evaluations. Moreover, a broader reflection on the findings
of the literature is provided. Specific difficulties of formulating and measuring emotional
and valuational factors are discussed inviting reflection on the possibility of handling
relevant factors in a more flexible, case-specific, and context-specific way rather than
adhering to a rigid set of operationalized criteria.
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INTRODUCTION
Patients’ decision-making capacity or competence (DMC) is the gatekeeping element establishing
the role of patient choices in medical decisions. In view of the legal and ethical implications, the
concept has been intensely investigated both theoretically and empirically over several decades.
One long-standing debate concerns the definition of relevant criteria of DMC, in terms of
mental abilities. In the 1990s, great advances were made by Grisso and Appelbaum (1998), who
distilled and systemized relevant mental abilities on the basis of United States case law (Appelbaum
and Grisso, 1995). This extensive work yielded the four traditional criteria that have remained
influential ever since: (1) understanding refers to the ability to comprehend treatment-related
information, such as information about the present disorder, treatment options, and related risks
and benefits; (2) appreciation refers to the ability to acknowledge that one is suffering from a
particular disorder (i.e., insight into the disorder). It also refers to the ability to recognize the
consequences for oneself of the disorder and of potential treatment options, including the ability
to acknowledge that treatment could be beneficial (i.e., insight into the necessity of treatment);
(3) reasoning refers to the ability to manipulate information rationally, using logic to compare
the risks and benefits of treatment alternatives; and (4) evidencing a choice refers to the ability to
communicate a choice (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998).
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While these standards have some validity and have
significantly helped to improve DMC evaluations, they have been
and continue to be challenged. Critics characterize the traditional
approach as too cognitive and/or too procedural in failing to
take proper account of non-cognitive factors and/or substantive
elements (e.g., Charland, 1998b; Banner, 2013). Specifically,
critics advocate for fuller acknowledgment of emotional factors
and values within DMC evaluations.
Various, sometimes overlapping or even conflicting arguments
have been advanced in favor of this claim. However, the
literature fails to provide a comprehensive understanding of the
significance of emotions and values in DMC evaluation, making
any significant advance in this matter difficult. To overcome
this barrier, the present paper provides, first, a nuanced and
structured overview of the medical ethics literature with regard
to existing arguments for stronger recognition of emotions and
values in DMC evaluations. Second, a broader reflection and
discussion on the findings of the literature are provided. The aim
of this overview is to advance the debate, to stimulate further
development, and last, but not least to inform clinicians seeking
for stronger theoretical embedding of their clinical observations.
METHOD AND FRAMEWORK
The paper provides a narrative review of arguments. Publications
were considered that place a primary focus on conceptual
analysis concerning the role of emotion and value in DMC.
Arguments were extracted while looking for argument variation
and saturation.
Subsequently, arguments were assorted into four categories
along two dimensions: (a) domain (emotion vs. value), and (b)
account (procedural vs. substantive). The categorization aims to
foster conceptual clarity and to help identify potential research
gaps. Table 1 summarizes the findings.
Domain: Emotion and Value
We have decided to consider both kinds of arguments either
concerning emotion or value. It is reasonable to discuss these
factors together, as they share a common feature: their evaluative
function (Kluge, 2005; Charland, 2006). Both a person’s emotions
and their personal values provide information about the specific
valence of aspects of the world—emotions in more affective terms
and values by means of more elaborated, reflective endorsement.
Although emotions and values covary and overlap, it seems useful
to review the literature in terms of these two categories, as in
most cases either the affective dimension or the individual’s set
of reflectively endorsed values is emphasized. The terms emotion
and value are used here in a relatively broad sense, in line with
their wide range of usage in the literature, from affective arousal
to gut feelings and from more abstract values to more concrete
preferences.
Epistemic beliefs, which also play an important role in
DMC, are further to be distinguished from emotions and
values. Such beliefs pertain to a person’s (mis) perception of
reality or their (ir) responsiveness to evidence, as captured
under the traditional appreciation standard. Delusion in the
course of a psychotic episode is the paradigm case in which
a patient’s DMC is questioned due to distorted beliefs (Grisso
and Appelbaum, 1998). There is a conceptual difference between
making a decision based on untrue beliefs about reality and being
responsive to evidence but basing a decision on an evaluative
judgment relating to those facts. Differentiating between beliefs
and evaluative elements such as emotions and values is therefore
important for conceptual clarity.
Account: Procedural and Substantive
The distinction between procedural and substantive
understandings of the impact of values and emotions on
DMC is of fundamental importance. This relates to discussions
of whether or not DMC, and more generally the concept
of personal autonomy, is content-neutral (value-neutral) or
content-laden (value-laden) (Freyenhagen, 2009; Owen et al.,
2009).
The prevailing procedural account is characterized by its sole
focus on formal requirements as the only reflective processes
used in arriving at a decision, or on the structural character
of the underlying values, preferences, and desires (Mackenzie
and Stoljar, 2000). As long as these procedural demands are
met, people are allowed to make decisions on whatever grounds
they choose—rational or irrational. Procedural accounts are
motivated by the principle of respecting pluralism in society
and therefore refrain from judging the lifestyle, value system,
viewpoint, or reasons underpinning a decision as more or less
appropriate.
Against this, substantive accounts claim that to resist
consideration of a patient’s motives is to fail to take adequate
account of real conditions, as for instance in the case of
irrational anxiety, so rendering DMC evaluations less meaningful
(Freyenhagen and O’Shea, 2013). Here, the content of reasons
underpinning a decision is scrutinized and judged as either
problematic or unproblematic for DMC. Insofar as personal
values and emotions serve as reasons, they are potentially subject
to such substantive judgments, which are always value-laden in
prescribing what kinds of emotions or values are acceptable.
Clearly, then, substantive requirements restrict pluralism to some
extent (Freyenhagen and O’Shea, 2013).
RESULTS
Importance of Emotions from a
Procedural Perspective
The literature deals most extensively with the impact of emotions
from a procedural or content-neutral perspective. Arguments
concern the necessary and appropriate extent of emotional
involvement, the negative impact of emotions on cognitive
faculties, the role of habitual patterns of emotional processing,
and the undermining of authenticity by emotion.
When Patients Do Not Take Their Emotions into
Account
Advocacy for the inclusion of emotions in DMC evaluations
derives to a great extent from observation, and from the
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TABLE 1 | Arguments for acknowledging emotion and value in DMC.
Emotion Value
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• Emotions provide crucial information and are essential in decision making
− Full appreciation requires emotion
− Strong emotional avoidance/denial is problematic
• Affective arousal derails cognitive functions and overpowers rational thought
• Too little or too much of emotional engagement is problematic
• Habitual patterns of emotional processing matters
− Recognition of intra-individual norms is important
• Emotions impede authentic decision making
− Emotions impact on the coherence of preferences
− Affectively first-order desires conflict with second-order desires
• Values provide a conception of the good and are essential in decision
making
• Minimally stable and consistent values are required for (authentic)
decision making
• Pathological values deriving from a mental disorder impede authentic
decision making
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• Emotions decrease responsiveness to evidence
− Concretized emotion-belief complex
− Preoccupation with or denial of risks and benefits
• Problematic emotions
− Feelings of indifference concerning one’s own welfare
− Pathological hopelessness
• Affectively driven under- or overvaluation of risks and benefits
• Rationality of values matters
• Weighing and balancing information (reasoning) means to assign the
right value to each item of information
• Values that denigrate the status of the decision maker as a person are
problematic
acknowledgment that decision making is an emotional process—
that is, emotions have an essential function in decision making
that adds incrementally to contributions from cognitive or
analytical capacities (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). In support
of this argument, repeated reference is made to neuroscience and
to the paradigm case of patients with lesions in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, as described at length by Antonio Damasio
(Appelbaum, 1998; Charland, 1998b). Despite their fully restored
intellectual capacities, these patients make disastrous decisions
in complex everyday situations by virtue of their ‘hard-wired’
inability to incorporate affective cues into their decision-making
process (Damasio, 1994).
The positive functions of emotions in decision making are
emphasized by those who advocate stronger recognition of
emotional factors in DMC evaluations. Emotions are seen to
constitute a specific source of knowledge that provides us with
crucial information about the overall nature of our current
situation, including internal states as well as external events. They
tell us about the personal value and meaning of aspects of our
world and are therefore essential in generating, defining, and
keeping track of our goals and preferences. Furthermore, it is
argued that emotions motivate us and lend reason to our choices.
In sum, they help to promote our well-being and enable us to
reach value-congruent or authentic decisions (Cox White, 1994;
Silverman, 1997; Charland, 1998a,b).
In light of these positive effects of emotions, it is argued
that an overriding ignorance or suppression of affective
cues—or a substantially impaired capacity for emotion—makes
it impossible to incorporate essential information into the
decision-making process. Decisions are then made without
complete information, and this is considered an impediment to
competent decision making (Cox White, 1994; Silverman, 1997;
Charland, 1998a,b). A substantial absence of emotion is seen to
constitute a loss, potentially leading to choices that are grossly
detached from a person’s self and anchored solely in objective
facts.
More specifically, it is argued that emotional engagement and
processing is crucial to a full appreciation of one’s situation
(Charland, 1998a). The argument is advanced that a merely
intellectual grasp of being personally affected by a particular
clinical condition and by the consequences of disease or
of potential treatment options (the traditional understanding
of appreciation) is insufficient. Alternatively, appreciation is
conceived as understanding, in a more experiential sense, what
the consequences would really entail—for example, “what it
would be like and ‘feel’ like to be in possible future states
and to undergo potential alternatives.” (Buchanan and Brock,
1989, p. 24). Indeed, it is both disturbing and dubious when a
patient remains totally dispassionate and without emotion when
confronted with a life-threatening disease or a serious medical
decision. Mental states characterized by strong emotional
avoidance, significantly impoverishing the ability to appreciate
the personal relevance of information, are relevant in this regard
(Rudnick, 2002). Such psychological defenses appear to play a
significant role, for instance, in anosognosia and anosodiaphoria,
imposing great constraints on rehabilitation (Turnbull et al.,
2014). Thus, Silverman (1997, p. 171–172) argues that, for DMC,
“individuals must be able to pay attention to emotions, recognize
them as relevant information, remember their relationship to past
and preferred states of affairs, and determine whether acting on
such emotions will further their well being.” However, a caveat
must be added regarding patients, who suffer from episodic
memory impairment. They would be unable to think about their
personal future rather than being dispassionate and without
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emotion. Therefore it is not the emotional factor that is lacking,
but the cognitive function.
When Patients Are Overwhelmed by Emotions
While in the preceding argument DMC is challenged because
too little attention is paid to emotional information, the reverse
case is also possible and problematic. Imagine a patient who
experiences intense affective arousal in the aftermath of a serious
diagnosis, so that she appears overwhelmed by intense emotions,
perhaps, cannot stop crying, to the extent that feelings totally
overpower rational thought. Basic mental functions such as
concentration, attention, or the ability to retain information
are impeded to the extent that she does not meet minimal
requirements for understanding and deliberation (Cox White,
1994; Banner, 2012). Such cases invite attention to emotional
factors, as they impact negatively on cognitive abilities or on the
traditional criteria. In general, it is worth acknowledging that
cognition and emotion are strongly interwoven—in other words,
that cognition inherently involves emotion (e.g., Dolan, 2002).
To conclude up to that point, DMC is concerned with the
appropriate level of emotional involvement or on the inclusion
of affective cues in patients’ decision-making; both a lack or an
excess of emotion is problematic (Brown, 2011; Banner, 2012).
When Patients Process Emotions in an Atypical or
Unusual Way
Imagine a patient who has been consulting a physician for years,
so that her personality and preferences are well known to the
physician, who is acquainted with her intuitive and emotionally
driven decision-making style. On a particular occasion, however,
she is unable to attend to or rely on her emotions, and behaves
in a calculating and distanced way that clearly deviates from
her typical conduct (Cox White, 1994). In these circumstances,
concerns may arise about the patient’s DMC; the same would
apply to a patient who is known to be quintessentially rational
but suddenly relies only on their gut feelings. Such cases can call
DMC into question because the person decides in a manner that
is atypical for him or her. Abrupt changes in patients’ conduct
generally warrant caution, as they indicate that something is
disordered (Grisso and Appelbaum, 1998). Moreover, Cox White
(1994, p. 137) argues that “Letting a patient make decisions
without the evaluations he normally considers important and
worthy of attention permits him to go astray from the structuring
or restructuring of his life plans”; this in turn is regarded as
an impediment to the patient’s well-being and autonomy of
choice.
On the flip side, as long as a person complies with her
typical decision-making style, it is argued that there is no
reason to question her DMC even if she decides in an overly
emotional or overly rational manner compared to the average.
Cox White (1994), for example, holds that it is not legitimate
to deem a person incompetent only because they are generally
unemotional and quintessentially rational, never expressing their
emotions because they do not allow themselves to experience
them; to overrule a person’s typical response fails to respect his
individuality. In similar vein, Mackenzie and Watts (2011a,b)
discuss the implications of an emotional capacity standard for
the so-called neurodiverse, such as a person diagnosed with
an autism spectrum disorder, who might by such a standard
be at risk of being unjustifiably deemed incompetent by virtue
of their abnormal emotionality. In their view, respect for this
unemotional decision-making style is warranted because it is
typical for that person.
In sum, appropriate attention must be paid to person’s
decision-making style. However, as the literature suggests,
considerations of style and preferences might conflict in certain
instances with the required minimum degree of emotional
involvement as outlined above.
When Patients Decide Inauthentically on the Basis of
Affective States
Another cluster of reasons for considering emotional factors as
relevant to DMC touches on the notions of authenticity and
accountability as criteria for DMC (Elliott, 1991). As Brown
(2011, p. 199) observes, striking mood shifts or labile conditions
seem to “undermine a person’s decision making from within as
if there were no one executive decision-maker whose authority
is recognized by competing mental states, as if a federation were
functioning without any central government.”
When a person is affected by deep depressive feelings,
for instance, their values, desires, beliefs, and dispositions are
often so dramatically changed that their decisions are widely
inconsistent with their authentic character in a healthy state.
The patient’s choices are not truly theirs but more a result of
their mental illness, and they seem not fully accountable for their
decisions (Elliott, 1997). Similarly, Rudnick (2002, p. 153) argues
that “pervasive emotional states or moods impact on preferences
by regulating their relative weights and perhaps less commonly
by generating new preferences, thus modifying the set—and
hence the coherence—of preferences held by the individuals
experiencing these moods.”
While regarding such incoherence as problematic for DMC,
Rudnick (2002) also acknowledges the challenges posed by
chronic depression or dysthymia, where changed preferences are
so persistent and ingrained in personal identity that one can
hardly describe them as inauthentic.
Authenticity or accountability may also be threatened in
instances where, according to Frankfurt (1971), affectively driven
first-order desires conflict with a person’s second-order desires.
This is often observed in persons suffering from addiction and
may also apply to persons with certain phobias (Frankfurt, 1971;
Charland, 2002). Imagine, for example, a person who is fully
aware of the benefits of treatment and is keen to have it (second-
order desire) but is so terribly afraid of hypodermic needles
that they take flight in panic on encountering same (first-order
desire).
Importance of Personal Values from a
Procedural Perspective
In line with the prevailing procedural account, the second
most elaborated cluster of arguments claims to recognize
personal values in a content-neutral manner, encompassing such
fundamental concerns as the indispensability of a stable set of
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 765
fpsyg-07-00765 May 24, 2016 Time: 12:30 # 5
Hermann et al. Decision-Making Capacity, Emotion, and Value
values for decision-making in general and for DMC in particular,
together with more sophisticated reasons related to authenticity.
When Patients Lack an Elaborated Value System
Imagine a patient suffering from advanced dementia who is
increasingly losing his sense of self, including his conception
of what is valuable to him and what he considers desirable
to strive for. Although he can momentarily indicate his needs
by showing pleasure or aversion, he is no longer able to align
these responses to a represented set of personal values, making
it impossible to evaluate any information about an upcoming
treatment or to reflect on the factors underlying and motivating
a choice. Alternatively, one may think of a 10 year-old girl
who meets all the cognitive standards but is only beginning
to develop a sense of her adult self and her own conception
of the desirable. Again, her values may not yet be sufficiently
elaborated to properly balance relevant treatment information.
In both cases, DMC is challenged on the grounds that a
personal value system and a related capacity to assign personal
significance to one’s options are essential in decision-making.
This is particularly true if competent decisions are to result in
choices that are personally meaningful, based on reflections about
one’s motives, and potentially beneficial for the decision-maker’s
subjective well-being (Buchanan and Brock, 1989). People need
a conception of the good against which they can weigh and
evaluate alternative treatment options (Buchanan and Brock,
1989).
In other words, concepts of value provide reference points for
reflection, explanation, and justification of one’s motivation for
choosing a particular alternative. If a patient does not possess a
sufficiently elaborated set of values in which their decisions are
embedded, no meaningful or autonomous choices can be made,
and DMC is called into question (Buchanan and Brock, 1989;
Breden and Vollmann, 2004; Kluge, 2005).
When Patients Lack Consistent Values
The mere presence of values, however, seems insufficient. For
DMC, it is additionally required that these values are minimally
stable and consistent over time (Charland, 2001; Kluge, 2005;
Craigie, 2013). It is argued that “sufficient value stability is
needed to permit, at the very least, a decision that can be stated
and adhered to over the course of its discussion, initiation and
implementation” (Buchanan and Brock, 1989, p. 25)—otherwise,
one can hardly develop consistent plans, and risks being caught
in motivational conflicts (Kluge, 2005). Imagine a cancer patient
who must decide whether he wants to continue with curative
treatment that might prolong his life or to stop it and begin with
palliative care. He is torn between the options and constantly
changes his mind, struggling with whether to give priority to
extension of life or a peaceful death and caught in a strong
ambivalence that he cannot overcome by himself.
Consistency of values is closely related to the notion of
authenticity, in that decisions made on the basis of enduring
personal values will also appear authentic (Mackenzie and Watts,
2011b). However, it is problematic to take an enduring set of
values as a criterion for either authentic or competent decision-
making, given that values evolve and change over time, or may
even undergo radical change in particular situations—as, for
example, in drastic end-of-life circumstances (Mackenzie and
Watts, 2011b; Craigie, 2013).
When Patients Rely on Inauthentic Values
A heated debate has arisen concerning the relation between
values and authenticity in the context of mental disorders—
more specifically, with reference to anorexia nervosa (Charland,
2006; Grisso and Appelbaum, 2006; Tan et al., 2006, 2009;
Vollmann, 2006; Whiting, 2009). Tan et al. (2006) coined
the term pathological values to circumscribe those values of
anorexic patients that originate from their disorder rather
than from the individual themselves. They argue that decisions
based upon such pathological values challenge DMC because
these values are not authentic or in line with that person’s
expected values if they were not affected by a mental
disorder. In the anorexic patient, for example, overvaluation
of thinness may be regarded as pathological insofar as it is
a causal consequence of anorexia nervosa—a mental disorder
characterized by, among other things, the diagnostic criterion
of intrusive fear of fatness—and so belongs to the disease
rather than to the individual (Tan et al., 2006). Moreover,
this overvaluation of thinness is likely to vanish when the
disorder abates, and vice versa (Charland, 2006). It appears
then that justifications of incompetence based on pathological
or inauthentic values are closely bound to or apply only
in the context of a diagnosed mental disorder (Tan et al.,
2009).
As previously discussed in the context of affective disorders
and authenticity, challenges regarding this argument arise when
anorexic patients experience an enduring change of personal
identity, where the disorder becomes so constitutive of self that
patients can no longer imagine being free of it (Tan et al., 2006;
Hope et al., 2013). Intriguingly, Hope et al. (2011) have shown
that many patients suffering from anorexia nervosa experience
the disorder as separate from the real self, distinguishing between
an authentic real self and an inauthentic anorexic self. However,
others experience their anorexia “not as a separate self but as
integral to a single self.” (Hope et al., 2011, p. 24), calling into
question whether we can still speak of inauthentic values in these
cases.
Importance of Emotions from a
Substantive Perspective
A third cluster of arguments concerns the substantive or content-
laden influence of emotions on DMC. Interestingly, most of
these contributions do not pertain directly to the content of
emotions but argue for their indirect impact on substantive
elements by way of epistemic beliefs. Insofar as such beliefs rely
upon epistemic norms that are content-laden, the manner of
their constraint by emotion is best discussed from a substantive
perspective. By contrast, there are no explicit and profound
analyses or justifications of the appropriateness of specific
emotive reasons in the context of DMC. There are only some
theoretical reflections, especially in relation to depression, that
more or less implicitly allude to the relevance of emotions from a
substantive point of view.
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When Patients Misperceive Reality Due to Affective
States
Emotions are seen to impact negatively on DMC by affecting the
patient’s responsiveness to evidence, their perception of reality,
or their epistemic beliefs, respectively. In terms of the traditional
approach, one might say that affective factors impact negatively
on the appreciation criterion.
An elaborated account on the impact of emotion on epistemic
beliefs is presented by Halpern (2011, 2012), who labels the
DMC-impoverishing interplay she describes as a concretized
emotion-belief complex. At the core of her argument lies the
observation that there are patients who are caught in an affective
state—often in the aftermath of a traumatizing or shocking
event—that is frequently accompanied by catastrophic thinking,
rendering them unable to feel differently in the present or to
imagine feeling differently in the future. In addition, they are
unable to grasp that they are subject to this emotional point of
view and that their current affective state directly impacts on
their epistemic beliefs about the future. As a consequence, their
cognitive responsiveness to evidence is undermined, as is their
ability to deliberate meaningfully on the future (Halpern, 2012).
Similarly, Meynen (2011) argues that in depression a person’s
perception of the world and of their possibilities certainly
changes, even to the point of substantial bias that would
be considered problematic for competent decision-making. As
Bursztajn et al. (1991, p. 386) note, affective disorders are
often characterized by “an emotionally involving, self-convincing
preoccupation with the risks of treatment coupled with denial
of the benefits.” It is the profound feeling of hopelessness that
can render the depressed patient incapable of envisioning any
possibility of recovery or even of relief from suffering (Leeman,
1999).
Comparable effects have been observed and discussed in the
context of anorexia nervosa, whose characteristic signs include
strong anxiety associated with eating to put on weight and
related negative feelings such as self-disgust on seeing one’s body.
These feelings lead anorexic patients to a judgment that they
are too fat, which is counterevident from an objective point
of view. Although often able to see and intellectually grasp
the objective evidence, their affective responses prompt these
patients to believe differently and to assess their weight against a
purely subjective standard (Hope et al., 2013). In short, they lack
affective responsiveness to objective norms and evidence.
When Patients Rely on Problematic Emotions
Proponents of a substantive account of DMC place particular
emphasis on the reasons underlying a patient’s choice, and
on the judgment of these reasons as more or less appropriate
or supposedly recognizable (Freedman, 1981; Charland, 1998b;
Banner, 2012, 2013). It is further acknowledged that emotions
constitute a particular class of reasons and are therefore subject
to such evaluation.
Depression is an affective disorder characterized by
hopelessness, helplessness, deeply entrenched feelings of
guilt and worthlessness, anhedonia, and other symptoms. These
feelings are likely to affect the value assigned by patients to
themselves, to their lives, and more specifically to the treatment
options and outcomes they face. One likely consequence of such
feelings is that a patient will become largely insensitive to their
own welfare, perhaps to the point of not caring about risk, or even
positively valuing negative consequences such as death (Elliott,
1997; Freyenhagen and O’Shea, 2013). That being so, should
we ever consider someone’s deep feelings of worthlessness as a
legitimate or recognizable reason to refuse life-saving treatment?
Bursztajn et al. (1991, p. 384) argue that “affective disorders
may impair DMC in a detectable and identifiable way, primarily
influencing the meaning and weight given to treatment risks and
benefits.” And Rudnick (2002) points to felt indifference and the
problem of undervaluing positive outcomes in depression—both
of which, he says, undermine DMC. Other authors only touch
on these substantive features; Sullivan and Youngner (1994), for
example, point to the difficulty of distinguishing between realistic
and pathological hopelessness among terminally ill patients.
By the same token, most of these authors are also aware of
the challenge inherent in substantive approaches in terms of the
value judgment they entail: “Assessing a patient as emotionally
incompetent may bring us once again into the difficult realm of
distinguishing the competency assessor’s values or preferences for
treatment from the patient‘s emotional state.” (Glass, 1997, p. 22).
Halpern (2011, 2012) takes an explicit position that declines to
deem a depressive patient incompetent if they undervalue life.
According to her, as long as the depressed person retains their
cognitive abilities and is responsive to evidence, his or her values
and choices should be respected.
Importance of Personal Values from a
Substantive Perspective
In the realm of values, analyses of their relation to epistemic
beliefs (as in the context of emotions) do not exist, or values
and beliefs are wrongfully equated (e.g., Grisso and Appelbaum,
2006). Moreover, the predominant argument in the literature
concerns why the content of values matters, but in-depth analyses
of specific types of values remain rare.
When Patients Rely on Problematic Values
From a substantive perspective, personal values are considered
relevant to DMC in that they provide reasons on which to base
decisions. As such, they are subject to normative judgments
regarding their appropriateness. Charland (2001, p. 139), for
example, states that “simply having values is not enough.
A certain kind of rationality is also required.” He stresses that
normative considerations associated with value can never be
eliminated from the evaluation of DMC. Imagine, for instance,
a man suffering from a disease requiring hospitalization and
treatment for at least 2 weeks. He refuses treatment, explaining
that he does not want to stay away from home for so long,
leaving his precious plants behind. He accepts the potential health
impairments as long as he can stay with his many plants—his
dearest companions. In such a case, discussion may proceed
from whether or not his reason to forego treatment is sufficiently
recognizable or rather indicative of incompetence.
Other authors are more specific, arguing that judging a
person’s capacity to use, weigh, and balance information—
termed reasoning in the traditional approach, where it is
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regarded as a purely procedural standard—necessarily involves
a normative judgment (Banner, 2012, 2013; Holroyd, 2012).
In saying that a person is properly weighing and balancing
information, we refer not only to the logical consistency of their
argumentation but also to whether the person assigns to each
item of information its due significance for the decision-making
process, or weighs the information appropriately. Accordingly,
Holroyd (2012, p. 157) provocatively asks whether “weighing
information requires that certain specific commitments and
rankings are held?” In the context of anorexia nervosa, one
could then say, for instance, that the patient is “improperly
valuing nourishment and giving too much weight to food
avoidance and maintaining a low weight.” (Holroyd, 2012,
p. 157) From this perspective, we would then speak of
pathological values because these are inherently problematic
rather than merely impeding authentic decisions (Vollmann,
2006).
A more concrete stance on why particular values are
problematic is taken by Kluge (2005, p. 299). He suggests that
values that “denigrate the status of the decision-maker or others
as person”—and therefore inherently conflict with principle-
based values that acknowledge the equal and intrinsic moral
worth and dignity of human beings, as proclaimed in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights—challenge competent
decision making. As an example, he cites the octogenarian who
foregoes life-saving treatment because she perceives herself to
cause a burden as an unproductive member of society and of her
family.
Proponents of a substantive understanding of DMC are
entirely aware of the well-known risks of arbitrariness and undue
paternalism in making value judgments (Breden and Vollmann,
2004; Tan et al., 2006; Whiting, 2009; Radoilska, 2012) and try to
find ways of dealing with the implied challenges (Freedman, 1981;
Banner, 2013; Banner and Szmukler, 2013; Freyenhagen and
O’Shea, 2013). It goes beyond the scope of this paper to provide a
full review of existing proposals for dealing with these problems
or identifying a solution. However, in line with Freyenhagen and
O’Shea (2013), we believe that increased transparency or explicit
discussion of the values and beliefs guiding DMC evaluations,
as well as democratic contestability of conditions for DMC and
inter-subjective validation of judgment, can help to reduce the
risk of arbitrariness.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, the literature on the role of emotions and
personal values in medical DMC has been reviewed. Without
offering a detailed normative justification for the inclusion of
emotions or values in DMC evaluations, the overview provides
a summary of arguments and justifications advanced elsewhere.
To that end, these arguments are clustered in four categories,
from most to least elaborated, bringing conceptual clarity and
identifying potential research gaps. In this way, it contributes
to the ongoing debate by suggesting starting points for future
research to delve more systematically into specific concerns,
placing a stronger emphasis also on clinical correlates. The
following discussion shall present some broader reflections on the
specific challenges concerning the role of emotions and values in
DMC evaluations.
Overlapping Themes
The literature on the subject proves to be quite extensive, and
provides a variety of reasons for including emotion or value in
DMC evaluations. Furthermore, a closer look at these arguments
reveals the complex nature of DMC. Although we have tried
to sort the literature within a structuring framework in the
interests of more conceptual clarity, things might not be as clear-
cut in reality, given the overlap between emotion and value
and the interplay between cognition and emotion, and where
a distinction between procedural and substantive factors is not
always easily established.
This overview shows that similar themes emerge in the
realms of emotion and value. Both are relevant as indispensable
elements in decision making—or, indeed, as a potential threat
to the authenticity or accountability of a decision. Furthermore,
consistency over time plays a role, in terms of a habitual pattern
or style of emotional engagement on the one side and a minimally
stable set of values on the other side. Moreover, both emotion
and value figure as reasons underpinning a decision that can
be more or less appropriate in certain circumstances. As already
mentioned, there is also a conceptual overlap; emotions seem to
include a valuational component, and rationally endorsed values
are likely to be accompanied by some emotional involvement.
As a consequence, we may attribute DMC undermining aspects
to either domain, of emotion or value. In the context of
anorexia nervosa, for example, the prevailing discourse speaks
of pathological values (Tan et al., 2006), but a few prefer to talk
about pathogenic affective states (Charland, 2013). In respect of
other disorders, such as depression, the opposite seems to hold,
as a majority argues from the point of view of emotions.
Different Possibilities for Interpretation
In general, it seems that same phenomena can be interpreted
from different angles. To illustrate this, let us revisit the patient
who is afraid of hypodermic needles to such an extent that he
refuses treatment against his better knowledge and intent. This
case was discussed in relation to Frankfurtian second- and first-
order desires, and so was conceived an issue of authenticity
or accountability (Frankfurt, 1971). However, one could equally
argue otherwise, by demonstrating that this anxiety is so
strong that it totally overwhelms rational thought, or cognitive
abilities—or otherwise again, by judging it from a substantive
perspective and arguing that the anxiety is so irrational that we
cannot accept it as an appropriate reason to forgo treatment.
All of these arguments appear somehow plausible, so that
questions arise, first, about which of these arguments provides
the right justification for an incompetence judgment, and second,
which of them reflects our actual reason for doubting the
patient’s DMC. It seems unlikely that univocal answers to these
questions can be obtained but rather that all of these aspects
together, reflecting the specificity and complexity of the case,
cause us to question DMC and help us to justify an incompetence
judgment.
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Case-Specificity
The specificity and complexity of cases therefore seem important,
and this is supported by other observations from the literature.
Issues of value stability, emotional involvement and authenticity-
impoverishing impacts of emotions and values all require more
or less subtle differentiation to be indicative for incompetence:
A certain degree of value stability is necessary, but people
should also be allowed to change values radically; emotional
involvement that is too weak or too strong appears indicative of
incompetence, but this depends on the extent to which cognitive
abilities are affected, or on the person’s typical decision-making—
even, perhaps, on the causes for inappropriate emotional
engagement. An inability to incorporate affective cues may be
differently interpreted in the context of precisely discernible
brain damage than in the context of a neurodiverse condition
such as autism. Furthermore, the authenticity or accountability
argument seems to work particularly well in the context of a
diagnosed mental disorder that implies a distinction between
a diseased inauthentic and a healthy authentic self. There
again, however, no universal claims apply, as it seems necessary
to differentiate between the acutely and chronically diseased.
Finally, the substantive account of emotions and values appears
particularly case-sensitive, even to the point of being accused of
total arbitrariness.
The absence of precise criteria concerning emotion and value
in DMC evaluations is unsurprising, as such criteria could be
formulated only conditionally and with an undefined number of
if provisions. It appears, then, that emotions and values cannot be
judged in isolation but only in light of their interaction with each
other and with other factors. In place of predefined, rigid criteria,
a more flexible, context-specific approach is clearly required.
Reconciliation Efforts
The difficulty to formulate criteria in terms of emotions or values
seems to contrast with the current traditional approach, which
purports to give well-defined, universally applicable, clearly
operationalized and objectively verifiable criteria. In this light,
efforts to take into account more ambiguous and complex soft
factors such as emotion and value appear to represent a great
threat for proponents of the traditional approach, who usually
defend their view and argue against emotional or valuational
criteria by presenting various arguments.
In the first place, they may refer to the authority of the U.S.
law from which the traditional criteria are derived, arguing that
modifications of the legal doctrine require rigorous proof of the
need for other criteria, as well as further consideration of the
costs involved in changing the legal practice (Appelbaum, 1998;
Grisso and Appelbaum, 2006). On the other hand, they may
argue that the traditional criteria in fact capture those patients
who are presumably lacking emotional or valuational capacity
(Grisso and Appelbaum, 2006), and that some non-cognitive
factors are already implicit in the traditional account (Kim, 2010).
For instance, in the debate on pathological values in anorexia
nervosa, Grisso and Appelbaum (2006) argue that the traditional
appreciation criterion already includes some consideration of
values. To establish this link, they equate values with epistemic
beliefs: “In fact, the analysis of most cases of lack of appreciation
find values, applied in a manner that involves a distortion of
reality, at the heart of the matter” (Grisso and Appelbaum,
2006, p. 295). They then illustrate the range of distorted beliefs
underpinning the decisions of anorexic patients—for example,
their belief that they are fat, although in reality they are just
skin and bones. Certainly, these beliefs challenge DMC, but they
provide a justification that differs from judging the value of
thinness as problematic for DMC because it can hardly reflect an
authentic value in the context of anorexia nervosa. It seems, then,
that Grisso and Appelbaum (1998) merged the notions of value
and belief to bring discussion of pathological values back within
the confines of the traditional approach.
A similar mechanism can be observed with regard to the
notion of appreciation, one of the four traditional standards
clearly defined and operationalized by Grisso and Appelbaum
but also occurring in ordinary language, with quite ambiguous
and versatile meanings. Authors may speak of an appreciation
of consequences and mean quite different things; for some, it
means being responsive to evidence, while for others it refers
to the ability to emotionally grasp the personal significance of
the consequences, and for still others it implies an allocation of
proper weights to each consequence. Thus, ostensibly operating
within the confines of the traditional approach, it is actually
about value and emotion. Therefore, we advocate for more
explicit mention and discussion of these non-cognitive factors to
prevent potential misunderstandings and conceptual confusions,
and to enable more targeted interventions in support of patient’s
decision making.
Operationalizing and Measuring
Emotions
Opponents of an emotion-inclusive approach to DMC further
argue that emotions need to be clearly operationalized and
measurable in a reliable manner before being included in DMC
evaluations (Appelbaum, 1998). This is indeed a challenging
or even conclusive argument, as it seems more difficult as
well as inappropriate to provide technical operationalizations
and measurements for emotions comparable to those used
in the assessment of cognitive faculties (Kontos et al., 2015).
Emotional processing seems not only more subjective but also to
require more contextually embedded evaluation that is sensitive
to the person in their entirety. Moreover, relational aspects
such as empathy seem to play a crucial role in the perception
and evaluation of emotional components—it is rather about
understanding patients than measuring them. In this light, a
rethinking of assessment procedures to take proper account of
emotional factors seems worthwhile.
Dealing with Different Requirements
To conclude, there seems to be a tension between the desire
to retain some legally binding criteria—universally applicable,
value-neutral, concise, and slight as possible—that can serve as
points of reference, especially in the case of legal proceedings, and
the requirement to take proper account of the complexity and
specificity of single cases—the nuanced occurrences, interplays,
and differentiations of mental processes, and their embedding
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in normative frames which together touch on our intuitions to
challenge a person’s DMC.
It is open to discussion how to reconcile these two
requirements and to balance the advantages and disadvantages
of a minimalistic and a more comprehensive and case-specific
approach. Nevertheless, it appears that we currently tend to
interpret the existing standards too narrowly, even try to adhere
desperately to them (as the above-mentioned reconciliation
efforts show), and sometimes forget that there is actually a scope
of discretion giving latitude to the peculiarities of individual
cases. After all, the traditional criteria were inferred from case
law, perhaps too directly translated into standardized measures,
so that in the course of this translation the case-based approach
was inappropriately replaced by a standardized frame into which
each case subsequently had to fit.
Directions for Future Research
We understand the literature on emotion and value to be an
attempt to explore the scope of discretion and peculiarities
applying to single or groups of cases, and to provide a
nuanced and case-sensitive understanding of the factors that
cause us to question a person’s DMC. The formulation of
additional operationalized criteria seems not to be—and, in
light of the aforementioned difficulties, cannot be—the primary
purpose of these contributions. Nonetheless, these analyses are
crucial, as they help to sensitize those who must evaluate and
justify incompetence to the multifold and case-related interplays
between contextual factors, various mental faculties, and their
normative underpinnings.
In general, a greater emphasis on case analysis seems
promising for a still more nuanced understanding of DMC
(Owen et al., 2009). This would include a stronger focus on
patient narratives, allowing relevant observations and statements
to be contextualized in order to fully understand and properly
interpret and appraise them. In particular, conclusions about the
authenticity of a decision or the recognizability of underlying
reasons require empathic immersion and analysis of patients’
stories and experiences. Continuative qualitative analyses of the
nature and experience of anorexia nervosa are exemplary in this
regard (Charland et al., 2013).
According to the proposed framework, substantive accounts
of both emotions and values will need to be investigated, as
these are relatively underrepresented in current analyses (see
also Table 1). Of particular interest is the deeper analysis
of fine differences between merely eccentric values, emotions,
or reasons in general and those that are problematic for
DMC, and the moderating conditions that determine the
transition. This would include further consideration of how to
conceive of and deal with the related problems of unjustified
paternalism and arbitrariness, as well as further reflection on
framing effects arising from diagnosis of a mental disorder.
While the healthy eccentric is explicitly granted the right to
self-determination, the eccentric with a psychopathology will
probably be required to present as more “normal” than those
without a psychiatric diagnosis if they are to be deemed
competent.
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